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JOHN LOCKE'S CHRISTIAN INDIVIDUALISM 
Richard J. Mouw 
John Locke is regularly portrayed as a key figure in the emergence of a kind 
of political-economic individualism that is antithetical to a Christian under-
standing of human nature. In this essay I argue that such an account fails to 
recognize Locke's own serious engagement with biblical themes. Locke's 
discussions of political topics are in fact very much in the mainstream of 
Christian thought. But he begins to depart from biblical patterns, I argue, 
when he offers a confused account of the sense in which human beings 
"belong" to God. 
On March 30, 1696, John Locke sat down to pen a letter to William 
Molyneux, in response to his Irish friend's urging that Locke write "a treatise 
of morals." He had given serious thought to writing such a book, Locke 
confessed, but he had decided that it would not be a good use of his time. 
Indeed he had even come to the conclusion that the world did not need such 
a philosophical study. "[T]he Gospel," Locke wrote, "contains so perfect a 
body of Ethicks, that reason may be excused from that enquiry, since she may 
find man's duty clearer and easier in revelation than in herself."\ 
This pious declaration would have done nothing to satisfy the Reverend 
John Edwards, a retired Calvinist clergyman who during that same year of 
1696 published a book entitled Socinianism Unmask'd, the second of several 
scathing attacks by Edwards on Locke's religious views. Edwards was con-
vinced that the author of The Reasonableness of Christianity was a unitarian 
heretic-or as Edwards actually put it, that Locke had shown "himself to be 
of the right Racovian breed"2 (thus linking Locke to a Socinian school of 
thought that had been flourishing during the 17th century in the Polish city 
of Rakow). 
What most disturbed Edwards about Locke's theology was Locke's insis-
tence that, in Edwards's words, there is "but One Article of Faith in all the 
Chapters of the four GospeLs and the Acts of the ApostLes," namely, that "Jesus 
is the Messiah." To settle for such a simple formula requires, Edwards in-
sisted, that one not only ignore "several considerable passages in the very 
GospeLs," but that one must also set "aside the Epistles, as if they were no 
part of the New Testament."3 
Of all of his critics, Locke seemed to find Edwards especially irritating. 
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But Locke's most recent biographer, Maurice Cranston, suggests that at least 
part of this irritation was due to the fact that Locke felt vulnerable to 
Edwards's charge that he was operating with a very limited canon within the 
canon.4 Cranston even thinks that it was this particular criticism that moved 
Locke to concentrate, in the final years of his life, on the writing of his 
posthumously published work, A Paraphrase and Notes of the Epistles of St. 
Paul to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians. 
Cranston's suggestion is substantiated, I think, by the apparently apologetic 
tone of Locke's remarks in his prefatory "Essay for the Understanding of St. 
Paul's Epistles by Consulting st. Paul Himself." He there confesses that he 
had not previously grasped the intricacies of Pauline thought: 
I had been conversant in these epistles, as well as in other parts of sacred 
scripture, yet I found that I understood them not; I mean the doctrinal and 
discursive parts of them: though the practical directions, which are usually 
dropped in the latter part of each epistle, appeared to me very plain, intelli-
gible, and instructive.s 
I will not focus in any detail here on the contents of Locke's studies in the 
Pauline epistles. I do want to offer some comments, though, on the fact that 
Locke's wrestlings with biblical materials have been for the most part ignored 
by philosophers who have studied Locke's political thought. And I want to 
suggest that it would be a good thing if this situation were corrected, since 
Locke's explorations of the relationship of the individual to the larger societal 
unit can serve as an important resource for contemporary Christian reflection 
on the issues of public life. 
I 
Locke isn't the only 17th century political philosopher whose serious in-
terest in a theology of politics has been a closely guarded secret. As the 
historian J. G. A. Pocock has pointed out in his fascinating essay, "Time, 
History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes," books III and 
IV of Hobbes's Leviathan-which are roughly equal in length to the much 
discussed first two books-are devoted to a detailed study of biblical-theo-
logical matters; "yet the attitude of far too many scholars towards them," 
Pocock observes, "has traditionally been, first, that they aren't really there, 
second, that Hobbes didn't really mean them. "6 And even when people have 
offered "esoteric reasons" as explanations of "why Hobbes should have writ-
ten what he did not believe," Pocock continues, 
the difficulty remains of imagining why a notoriously arrogant thinker, ve-
hement in his dislike of 'insignificant speech,' should have written and after-
wards defended sixteen chapters of what he held to be nonsense, and exposed 
them to the scrutiny of a public which did not consider this kind of thing 
nonsense at all.7 
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Pocock's case for taking Hobbes's discussions of biblical topics seriously is 
impressive. But an even more convincing argument can be made for looking 
carefully at Locke's theological explorations. For one thing, in Locke's case 
it has mainly been his treatment of the relationship of the Bible to political 
thought that has been ignored. Other religious writings, such as The Reason-
ableness of Christianity, and even his analysis of the political toleration of 
religious diversity, have been objects of sustained scrutiny. 
Nor has the scholarly community approached Locke's treatment of reli-
gious topics with the same degree of cynicism that it has directed toward 
Hobbes's references to revelational data. Henry F. May seems to express a 
scholarly consensus of sorts when he suggests that while it is reasonable to 
think that Locke's "frequent professions of Christianity were sincere 
enough," it is nonetheless "unlikely that he was a man of profoundly religious 
temperament. "8 
The criteria that we use to measure a philosophical writer's spiritual tem-
perament are not easy to establish in such a way that they are beyond chal-
lenge. But it is difficult to sustain the impression, while reading Locke's 
studies in the epistles, that the author's apparent enthusiasm for his task is 
merely a smokescreen to throw off a particularly cranky Calvinist pursuer. 
Furthermore, the Reverend Mr. Edwards's charge that Locke's interest in the 
Scriptures had been confined to the first five books of the New Testament 
loses a little more of its credibility when we look at the contents of Locke's 
First Treatise of Government, which had appeared in print, along with the 
Second Treatise, several years before Edwards published his allegations re-
garding Locke's narrow focus. 
The First Treatise seldom gets more than a passing mention from Locke's 
scholars, even from John Dunn, who has recently argued persuasively that 
"[t]he entire framework of [Locke's] thinking was 'theocentric' and the key 
commitment of his intellectual life as a whole was the epistemological vin-
dication of this framework."9 To be sure, it is difficult for contemporary 
political thinkers to get excited about the basic project of the First Treatise; 
the whole of that work is given over to a detailed refutation of the thesis of 
Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha-Filmer's thesis being that monarchial power 
is properly possessed only by those who are the legitimate heirs of Adam's 
parental authority. In the course of developing his critique of Filmer's patri-
archalism, though, Locke actually treats a number of important Biblical pas-
sages in considerable detail: he deals, for example, with such topics as the 
"dominion" mandate of Genesis 1, the nature and extent of the curse of the fall, 
the difference between parental and political authority, the creational status of 
women, and the Bible's perspective on the origin of national identities. 
There is much in Locke's discussions of these Old Testament materials, 
as well as in his studies in the Pauline epistles, that is worthy of closer 
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attention on our part. And not just for purposes of satisfying our historical 
curiosity. Locke argu~s, for example, against Filmer's insistence that Eve was 
created to be one of Adam's political subjects in a manner that is both 
insightful and highly relevant to contemporary Christian discussions of 
male-female relationships. 
The project of cultivating more sympathy for Locke's overtly Christian 
discussions of political topics has been given a boost by recent historical 
studies that have encouraged the blurring of some longstanding period mark-
ers. A notable case in point here is the work of Quentin Skinner, who argues 
in his much celebrated work, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 
that the "radical jurists" of the late medieval period and the Calvinists and Locke 
were all operating within the same conceptual-theological frameworkIO-a thesis 
that apparently has enough currency these days so that John Diggins is able to 
refer quite casually, in his recent study of American political history, to Lincoln's 
thought as a reaffirmation of "the Lockean-Calvinist tradition. "Il 
II 
If some scholars have begun to view Locke as closer to Christian political 
reflection than has often been thought to be the case in the past, the word 
doesn't seem to have reached the authors of the much discussed recent book 
Habits of the Heart. In the interpretive scheme set forth by Robert Bellah 
and his co-authors, Locke's views about human sociality stand in stark con-
trast to the biblical perspective. Here is the Bellah team's capsule account of 
the Lockean heritage: 
In seventeenth-century England, a radical philosophical defense of individual 
rights emerged that owed little to either classical or biblical sources. Rather, 
it consciously started with the biological individual in a "state of nature" and 
derived a social order from the actions of such individuals, first in relation 
to nature and then in relation to one another. John Locke is the key figure 
and one enormously influential in America. The essence of the Lockean 
position is an almost ontological individualism. 12 
And it is this same understanding of the Lockean position that has regularly 
served as the basis for much Christian hostility toward Locke's political 
thought. This hostility is especially strong among conservative Christians. It 
is not uncommon, for example, for traditional Roman Catholic and evangel-
ical thinkers to contrast a contractarian understanding of the basis of govern-
ment with the account of political authority set forth in the first seven verses 
of Roman 13. This is how Gordon Clark argued the point in a 1952 essay on 
political thought. After quoting the Romans passage, Clark observed that 
"government is a divine institution. The authority of magistrates does not 
derive from any voluntary social compact, but derives from God."13 
It is significant that both Clark and the Bellah team employ the "derived 
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from" formulation in this context. Clark says that contractarian thought tries 
to derive governmental authority from a voluntary compact rather than from 
the will of God. And while the Bellah group is not explicit about the source 
from which a "social order" can be derived, they are certain that the answer 
is not to be found in Locke's "almost ontological individualism." 
How would Locke respond to such characterizations of his thinking? For-
tunately, we have a way of gaining a fairly reliable answer to this question. 
In the course of his chapter-by-chapter commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans, Locke explicitly deals with the teaching set forth in Romans 13. 
And not only does he take the Apostle to be saying the same thing that Gordon 
Clark thinks Paul is setting forth in that chapter, but Locke also seems quite 
happy to endorse the Pauline teaching about governmental authority. The 
apostle is telling us, Locke says, that God is the source from whom "all 
magistrates, everywhere, have their authority," as well as addressing the 
question of "for what end they have it, and should use it. "\4 
On Locke's reading of Romans 13, then, the passage provides an answer 
to this question: what is the origin and end of political authority? And the 
answer given-an answer that Locke seems quick to agree with-is that the 
right to govern has its source in the divine Ruler and it must be used to 
promote the purposes for which God has established that authority, such as 
rewarding the good and punishing the evil. 
Having assured us of his endorsement of the Pauline perspective, Locke 
immediately goes on to point to some questions about political authority that 
the apostle does not address. He writes: 
But, how men come by a rightful title to this power, or who has that title, 
[the apostle] is wholly silent, and says nothing of it. To have meddled with 
that, would have been to decide of civil rights, contrary to the design and 
business of the gospel, and the example of our Saviour, who refused meddling 
in such cases with this decisive question, "who made me a judge, or divider, 
over you?,,\5 
Considerations, then, about how specific human beings come to possess that 
political authority that originates with God, and about who it is that may 
rightly claim possession of that power-such topics, Locke insists, are "med-
dling" questions that have no place within "the design and business of the 
gospel." But this does not mean that they are bad questions. Indeed, these are 
the very questions which Locke addresses at great length in his political 
writings, especiaUy in the Second Treatise. 
Locke obviously thinks that it was quite proper for the Savior to refuse to 
function as a "judge" and a "divider" with regard to political questions; Jesus 
chose instead to point in an unambiguous manner to the simple facts of the divine 
Rule. The issues that Jesus and Paul refrained from addressing-the questions 
which have to do with the judging and dividing of the actual realities of political 
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power-these "meddling" questions are the more mundane stuff of political 
thought to which philosophers must devote their attention. 
III 
Locke seems to be quite correct in dividing up the questions regarding political 
authority in this way. Indeed it is roughly the same way that John Calvin divided 
up the terrain of political discussion. While Calvin insists that civil magistrates 
"have been invested with divine authority, and are wholly God's representatives, 
in a manner, acting as his vicegerents,"16 he explicitly warns that this does not 
settle questions about the merits of actual forms of government. That kind of 
assessment, says Calvin, "depends largely upon the circumstances."I? 
Calvin obviously did not think that we can settle questions about the actual 
processes whereby political power comes to reside in specific magistrates by 
appealing to a passage such as Romans 13. And later Calvinists were to make 
this point with considerable force. Samuel Rutherford lays out the distinctions 
nicely in his 1644 tract, Lex, Rex: "all Royal power," he argues, "is only in 
God; but it is in the people as the instrument: and when the people maketh 
David their King at Hebron, in that very same act, God by the people using 
their free suffrages and consent maketh David King at Hebron." Nor is it 
necessary to think, says Rutherford, that Israel had to consent to the "prior 
act of God's making David King"; rather, he insists, it is in "Israel's act of 
freely electing him to be King" that God expedites the king-making. 18 Thus 
the people's delegating power to David simply is the way in which God 
delegates the power to David. 
Locke's method of sorting out the questions regarding political authority 
seems to be very similar to this. He sees the Bible as informing us that God 
gives civil authorities their power. But he does not take the Scriptures to be 
offering us a detailed account of the processes whereby magistrates gain 
possession of that power. Therefore Locke seems to think it quite legitimate to 
suggest that God used a process whereby individual citizens delegate divinely 
ordained power to specific authorities, under a contractual type arrangement. 
But isn't this precisely where Locke goes wrong? Isn't there something 
very un-Christian about his emphasis here on the individual as the primary 
political delegator? By insisting that the social-political bond can be broken 
down into individual units hasn't Locke become a very perverse kind of 
"judge" and "divider" of the political process? 
I think not. At least I am not convinced that Locke deserves the kind of 
hostility that has often been directed toward his emphasis on the importance 
of the political individual. I mean to be offering here, then, a modest defense 
of Locke's "individualism." Not that I want to defend everything that has 
been associated with the label "Lockean individualism." Locke himself would 
not, I am convinced, claim ownership of every item that has been subsumed 
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under that rubric. But I do think Locke deserves more Christian appreciation 
on this matter than has often come his way. 
IV 
The Bellah group is not opposed to individualism as such. "Individualism," 
they acknowledge, "lies at the very core of American culture." Even the two 
older perspectives-the republican and the biblical traditions-to which they 
look for help in the present cultural crisis are "in a profound sense individualis-
tic." Thus the authors of Habits of the Heart can speak of a "biblical individu-
alism" that affirms "the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the individual."19 
The Bellah group sees Lockean individualism, then, as a distorted version 
of a good kind of individualism that can even be found in the Bible. Individ-
ualism, they insist, has gone awry in contemporary life. And Locke's social 
perspective is an important contributor to the present crisis. 
Christian political philosophers can take heart from the Bellah group's 
insistence that a "biblical individualism" is an important corrective to the 
distorted understandings of individuality that are widespread in contemporary 
life. But we must not be too quick, I am suggesting, to follow Bellah and his 
associates in their identification of Locke's portrayal of the individual as a 
primary source of our present-day difficulties. 
In an article written in 1932 for The TImes Literary Supplement, on the 
occasion of the tercentenary of Locke's birth, Sir Ernest Barker credited 
Locke with a strong sympathy for biblical individualism. Locke possessed, 
Sir Ernest wrote, 
the great Puritan sense of the supreme importance of the individual soul; the 
Puritan feeling for the soul's right to determine its own relations to God, and to 
enjoy, at the least, toleration from the State and from all authority in so doing; the 
Puritan instinct for setting the bounds to the State-"thus far, and no farther.',zo 
More recently John Dunn has advocated a similar assessment of Locke's 
relation to biblical thought. Dunn has argued at length that Locke as a polit-
ical philosopher is an important ally in the struggle against contemporary 
instrumentalist accounts of political agencyY In contrast to the kinds of views 
that the Bellah group associates with utilitarian and expressive individualism, 
Dunn sees Locke's political thought as centered on the important, and much 
ignored, role of trust as the cementing factor in human social-political relations. 
Most modern political theorists don't even think about the question of what 
it is that holds society together, Dunn insists. And if they do think about it, 
he says, they are most likely to "offer a fairly variegated list of contributory 
factors: greed, fear, lust, conviviality, habit, hope, despair, indolence, an 
extremely high degree of selective inattention-and so on. "22 But Locke sees 
trust as the only factor that can give coherence to the social-political bond, 
and he sets out to ascertain the determinants which make that trust possible.23 
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The details of Dunn's exposition of Locke are intriguing-and I think con-
vincing. But it is not necessary to rehearse them here. What is directly relevant 
to our discussion is Dunn's insistence that, first of all, Locke really did think 
that trust is possible among human beings, and, second, that Locke's conviction 
on this matter was firmly grounded in his belief in God's creating purposes. 
Dunn establishes the first point by arguing that Locke operated "with a 
wholly unalienated conception" of human sociality.24 This may seem strange 
to those who think of the Lockean state of nature as a situation characterized 
by a pervasive distrust-but that reading of Locke's account stems, as Dunn 
shows, from the misguided insistence "that Locke's conception of the state 
of nature is distinguishable from that of Hobbes only by the degree of evasion 
with which Locke elects initially to describe it. "25 
This misreading of Locke chooses to ignore Locke's insistence on the 
"natural sociality" of human beings. And this is where Dunn's second point 
becomes important: his insistence that Locke grounded human trust in God's 
creating purposes. Here Dunn cites the rather clear formulation Locke offers 
in The Second Treatise: 
God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it was not 
good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, 
Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him 
with Understanding and Language to continue and enjoy it. 26 
Again, those of us who do profess to see the hand of the Almighty at work 
in human affairs ought to be more sympathetic than we sometimes have been 
to Locke's stated desire to acknowledge God's authority for political life. But 
our sympathies need not be unbounded. The fact that Locke has been so 
regularly blamed for trends that conflict with his own Christian professions 
constitutes at least prima facie evidence that he did not always pursue his 
social-political probings in a consistent manner. 
Even those who are most committed to defending the Christian integrity of 
Locke's philosophical project are careful to acknowledge his shortcomings 
in this regard. Dunn concedes, for example, that Locke can be plausibly 
viewed as slipping regularly into "a robustly hedonist mechanical theory of 
motivation. "27 And Sir Ernest Barker, having offered his glowing account, 
which I have already quoted, of Locke's "great Puritan sense of the supreme 
importance of the individual soul," is quick to add that "these nobler elements 
were mixed in Locke ... with ignobler things. "28 
Nor is it insignificant that Barker sees Locke's departure from his noble 
Puritan sentiments as most obvious in his views on the subject of property. 
Barker's judgment is borne out in Paul Marshall's helpful and detailed study 
of Locke's understanding of "calling." It is precisely "in his conception of 
work and labour" that Marshall sees Locke as having departed most signifi-
cantly from the Christian views that had shaped his thought. 29 
456 Faith and Philosophy 
I have no desire to defend Locke against the criticisms of these commentators, 
who are most sympathetic to his professions of Christian commitment. In his 
discussions of property and labor Locke obviously offers formulations which, 
when written large, can rightly be viewed as an encouragement to much 
of the unhealthy, instrumentalist individualism of contemporary life. 
I do find Locke's confusions in this area, however, to be instructive ones. 
Indeed it seems to me to be very important that Christian thinkers try to get 
clear about where Locke went wrong in his formulations-especially if we 
are convinced, as I am, that he does approach these topics with appropriately 
Christian designs. 
v 
Everyone who has ever read at least a few pages about Locke's political 
and economic thought knows that Locke believed that one may legitimately 
claim some natural item as one's personal property if one has mixed one's 
labor with that item. But it is not as widely acknowledged that Locke insisted 
that this account of human ownership deals with a derivative sense of prop-
erty. In the most basic sense there is only one property-owner-God. As 
Locke puts it in the Second Treatise: 
for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise 
Maker-all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his 
order, and about his business-they are his property whose workmanship they 
are, made to last during his, not one another's, pleasure. 3o 
In his well-known study of 17th century political thought, C. B. MacPherson 
makes it clear that he is not very impressed by these pious professions on 
Locke's part. MacPherson sees Locke as a key figure in the deVelopment of 
"possessive individualism" -a theory which portrays the human individual 
as the sole owner of his or her own "person and capacities."31 "[F]reedom 
from dependence on the wiIIs of others" is, on MacPherson's reading of 
possessive individualism, the very essence of properly functioning human-
ness; thus I as an individual owe nothing to anyone else as I go about deciding 
how to treat my own person, as well as those items which have become my 
personal property by the mixing of my labor with natureY 
Not that MacPherson simply ignores those Lockean themes that seem to 
run counter to the patterns of possessive individualism. He recognizes, for 
example, that Locke insisted that our individual economic projects must 
respect the limits prescribed by a divinely-ordained natural law. But this kind 
of traditional language, says MacPherson, mainly served to make possessive 
individualism more palatable to Locke's contemporaries, thus giving the the-
ory an attractive moral "facade" that would later be removed by more brutally 
consistent thinkers, like Hume and Bentham.33 
This is not an altogether fair reading of Locke. But neither can he be 
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absolved from all responsibility for the rise of possessive individualism. 
Locke's cUlpability in this regard has to do with at least two factors. The first 
is a matter of emphasis. While he did insist-as we have seen-that our 
human political and economic commitments must be viewed against the back-
ground of our creaturely dependence upon God, he did not rehearse that 
insistence with any vigor when he entered into his investigation of the actual 
details of our political-economic arrangements. It should not surprise us, then, 
if some commentators are left with the impression that his occasional refer-
ences to God have no serious role to play in his theory. 
But the second factor has to do with a weakness in the theological formu-
lations that Locke does offer with reference to property. In expressing his 
conviction that we human beings belong to God, Locke makes much of the 
fact that we are the creator's "workmanship." God's ownership of human beings, 
then, seems to be grounded in the same kind of relationship that a human owner 
has to a piece of physical property: God's proprietary claim on us seems to stem 
solely from the fact that God has expended labor in producing US. 34 
This is an unfortunate emphasis in Locke. And it means that, even if he 
had constantly repeated his belief about God's supreme ownership, Locke 
would not thereby have delivered himself of culpability with regard to the 
emergence of possessive individualism. 
MacPherson's analysis of Locke's view of property is a highly sophisticated 
version of an argument that is often given a much more cynical expression in 
popular Marxism. The cruder formulation treats Locke's insistence that we are 
God's possessions as a mere rationalization of the private property relations that 
serve-as Marxists view things-as the glue that holds feudal and capitalist 
societies together. If God himself can be rightly seen as the supreme possessor 
of private property, the Marxists argue, then the conditions that give rise to oppres-
sive systems of production are grounded in the very nature of things. 
Again, I think this is a much too uncharitable interpretation of Locke's 
position. But this crude Marxist portrayal of his scheme is an embarrassingly 
plausible approximation of the way in which some Christians have synthe-
sized an espousal of possessive individualism with a belief in God's authority 
and power. For example, that contemporary understanding of the Christian 
life that places a strong emphasis on a "name it and claim it" pattern of living 
often seems to rest on a belief in a God who is totally absorbed in the business 
of naming and claiming. The "Gospel of health and wealth" seems for all the 
world like the kind of message that would be issued by a deity who took 
primary enjoyment in maintaining his own health and wealth. 
Locke's way of depicting God's ownership of us had a role in shaping these 
patterns of thought. Not that Locke was wrong in saying that we are God's 
"workmanship." We are. But it does not follow from this that we are divine 
property in the Lockean sense. And if his argument here is questionable, then 
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it may also be that much of the rest of his analysis of property relations must 
also be challenged-if it is misleading to think of human beings as God's 
"property" in a straightforward sense, then it is also misleading to construe 
the relationship between human beings and their artifacts as property in some 
"derivative" sense. It may be that a consistently Christian Lockeanism would 
need to give much more attention to stewardship and trusteeship themes and 
much less to that of human ownership. 
We can wish, then, that Locke had said more about the notion that God is 
the supreme owner of all created people and things. And we can wish that in 
doing so Locke had made it clear that the Bible's depiction of God as one 
who delights in claiming human beings as his very own is not that of a cosmic 
entrepreneur who takes endless delight in the accumulation of possessions; 
rather, we are being given a glimpse of a mighty creator and redeemer who 
has condescended to ask us to offer him the love of our hearts. 
In one of his devotional meditations, Abraham Kuyper likens God's propri-
etary claims upon his human creatures to the relationship that a human artist has 
to a painting he has made. This is why our fallenness, Kuyper says, is a matter 
of such "bitter grief' to God: "The soul that He has made, has inwardly been 
tom asunder by sin, and is bruised and wounded almost beyond recognition. "35 
This is an important reminder of the Bible's use of the workmanship theme. 
But Kuyper only issues this reminder after he has already, in the preceding 
meditation, likened the relationship between God and a specific human crea-
ture to the bond between human parents and their individual children. Each 
of us is, says Kuyper, 
[n]ot merely one of His children, no, but His child in an individual way, in a 
personal relation different from that of the other children of God, the most intimate 
fellowship conceivable in heaven and on earth-He your Father, you His child.36 
We can only wish that Locke would have prefaced his comments about our 
being God's "workmanship" with some explanation of this sort. It is unfor-
tunate that he did not say very clearly that the relationship between the 
Creator and one of his human creatures is much more intimate than that which 
characterizes the relationship that human workers have to those physical 
objects upon which they have expended their labor-that it is more like the 
bond that holds between a mother and the child that she has birthed and named 
and nurtured in love. 
Locke gives the unfortunate impression that interpersonal relationships are 
patterned after person-object relationships. He could have avoided giving this 
impression by saying very unambiguously that interpersonal relationships are 
so much the pulsebeat of the universe that it would be less erroneous to think 
of our relationships to purely physical nature on the model of a loving bond 
between persons than it would be to conceive of interpersonal belonging as 
something like the owning of an object. 
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I do not think these sentiments would have seemed completely misguided 
to Locke. There is, after all, much evidence in Locke's writings for John Dunn's 
contention that interpersonal trust is the guiding concept in his social thought. 
Locke even says at one point that we have a right to trust God to keep his promises, 
since "[g]rants, promises, and oaths are bonds that hold the Almighty."37 
We can only wish that he would have extended this insight into an explicit 
endorsement of that biblical understanding of interpersonal "ownership" that 
is summarized so nicely in the first question and answer of the Heidelberg 
Catechism: that my "only comfort in life and death" is "[t]hat I, with body 
and soul, ... am not my own, but belong unto my faithful Savior Jesus Christ, 
who with His precious blood has fully satisfied for all my sins, and delivered 
me from all the power of the devil; ... and makes me heartily willing and ready, 
henceforth, to live unto Him. "38 
If Locke had unambiguously endorsed this understanding of what it means for us to 
belong to the God who claims us as his own, he would have done much to discourage 
the emergence of what has come to be known as "Lockean individualism." 
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